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Abstract 
Despite considerable research suggesting that creators place 
substantial value on attribution – the right to be credited with having 
created a work – U.S. intellectual property (IP) law, unlike its 
European counterparts, provides creators with almost no protection 
for attribution rights. In this Article, we report a series of 
experiments that are the first to attempt to quantitatively measure the 
value of attribution to creators. In previous research, we have shown 
that creators of IP are subject to a “creativity effect” that results in 
them assigning substantially higher value to their works than rational 
choice theory predicts. The experiments reported in this Article 
suggest that creators are willing to significantly reduce the amount of 
money they are willing to accept to license their IP rights in exchange 
for the opportunity to receive attribution for their work. These 
findings shed important light on emerging debates over whether and 
how American IP law should adopt attribution rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Imagine that you are a professional photographer, and you have 
been approached by two magazines that would like to purchase the 
rights to publish a photograph that you have taken. Magazine A 
offers you $1000 for the rights, while Magazine B offers you only 
$800 for the same opportunity to publish your photo. From a strictly 
economic perspective, this seems like a simple decision. But imagine 
that the circulation of B is considerably larger than the circulation of 
A. Might you think to yourself that there is some artistic or 
emotional value, or perhaps future economic advantage, to having 
your work seen by so many more people such that you would choose 
to publish with B for less money? 
 Now imagine that you are a young and as-yet-unknown author. 
You have been contacted by a publishing company that wants you to 
assist a politician in writing her memoirs. They give you a choice 
between two contracts: the first contract will pay you $25,000 but 
your name will not appear anywhere on the book, while the second 
contract will pay you $10,000 but your name will appear on the cover 
and title page of the book as a second author. Might you be willing to 
take the smaller payment in exchange for having your name on the 
book? You might value being named as an author because you feel it 
is morally right that you get credit, because it will enhance your 
reputation and social standing at cocktail parties, or because it could 
help you receive other, more lucrative writing contracts in the future. 
 This Article tests empirically the propositions suggested by these 
hypothetical questions and by a growing body of research, including 
some by the authors of this Article, finding that, in many fields of 
 3 
creative endeavor, people claim to assign considerable value to 
receiving attribution for the work that they have done.1  Intellectual 
property (IP) law in the United States, however, accords only 
extremely limited protection to a creator’s interest in her reputation. 
Instead, IP extends protection to an author or inventor’s ability to 
obtain financial compensation for the sale or use of her work.  To the 
extent that she desires recognition of her contribution to a work or 
product, she will typically have to bargain for it separately. 
 In earlier work, we have experimentally studied the ways in which 
creators assign monetary value to the things that they create.2 That 
research has suggested that creators are subject to a systematic bias 
that leads them to overvalue their work. This bias, which we have 
called the “creativity effect,” potentially results in inefficient markets 
in IP, because creators may be unwilling to license their works for 
rational amounts.3 That research, however, like American IP law 
itself, focused on the monetary value that creators derive from their 
                                                
1See KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER JON SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF 
ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming 2012) (describing how chefs, open source software programmers, 
and other creators value attribution); Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, 
Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19, 
2 ORGANIZATION SCI. 187 (2008) (describing norms governing attribution 
among French chefs); Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of 
Sauces: Should Thomas Keller's Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 1121 (2007) (describing social norms governing attribution among 
American chefs); Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law and Norms of 
Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49 (2006) (describing attribution norms across various 
fields). 
2Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 
UNIV. CHICAGO L. REV. 31 (2011) (hereinafter Creativity Effect); Christopher 
Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An 
Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010) (hereinafter Valuing IP). 
3Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 32. 
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work. We now expand that focus. The same methods used in our 
previous studies enable us to test the propositions that creators value 
opportunities for publication and attribution separately from the 
opportunity for financial remuneration. Although the research on 
reputation mentioned above has provided strong qualitative evidence 
for the notion that creators value attribution, it has made no effort to 
quantify that value. The experiments reported in this Article attempt 
to do just that.   
 The experiments reported below are based on a simple premise: if 
creators value opportunities for publication and attribution, they 
should be willing to trade off monetary compensation for those 
opportunities. In the experiments we conducted and report on in this 
Article, we set up a protocol that allows authors to make that tradeoff 
between monetary compensation on the one hand and publication 
and attribution on the other.  The results offer new insight into the 
value of attribution, and, we hope, will enrich the ongoing debate 
over whether American IP law, and especially American copyright 
law, should incorporate some form of general creators’ right to 
attribution.4  For reasons we will explain, our results suggest that 
adding a default right to attribution to American IP law would more 
                                                
4There is already in U.S. copyright law a narrow right to attribution that is given 
to the authors of a small category of very valuable works of fine art.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 106(A). See also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The 
Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1992-93 
(2006) (describing the limitations on the VARA that render the Act inapplicable 
to the majority of creative works). See below, notes 18-19. There is also in patent 
law a requirement that the actual inventor be named on the patent application, 
but nothing in patent law gives the inventor any right to have his name 
associated with his invention as it is actually made, sold, and used in the 
marketplace.  35 U.S.C. § 111. 
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likely worsen, rather than reduce, inefficiencies in IP licensing 
markets. 
 Part I of this Article describes our previous research on IP 
valuation and the questions that motivated the current research. It 
discusses earlier work on attribution and explains our premises for 
this new research. Part II reports on the methods and results of two 
experiments designed to test the value that photographers assign to 
publication and attribution. Part III explores the implications of our 
findings for the law. 
 
I.  ATTRIBUTION, PUBLICATION, AND THE VALUE OF IP 
A.  Valuing IP 
 In two previously published studies, we have examined the ways 
in which creators assign monetary value to their works. For decades, 
IP law has rested on a series of assumptions about how the creators 
of IP should behave. These assumptions are derived from ideas in 
neoclassical economics, and they propose that IP creators, like 
everyone else in the world, should behave according to the dictates of 
rational choice theory. Thus, creators should make rational, wealth-
maximizing decisions with respect to valuing, licensing, and selling 
their IP.5 In recent years, however, the assumption that people’s 
decisions conform to rational choice theory has been substantially 
undermined by empirical studies in behavioral economics. Most 
importantly, many studies have shown that when it comes to 
                                                
5See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003). 
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assigning value to things that they own, people are subject to a 
significant bias, known as the “endowment effect,” that results in 
considerable over-valuation of the owned goods.6 Accordingly, the 
amount of money people are willing to accept (WTA) to part with 
goods that they own is typically significantly higher than the amount 
of money that similarly situated people are willing to pay (WTP) to 
purchase those same goods. 
 In our earlier work, we inquired whether these same findings 
would appear for intellectual property, as well, even though IP is a 
different sort of property than any previously studied in the existing 
endowment effects literature.  Unlike land and ordinary personal 
property, IP is non-rival – i.e., its consumption by one person does 
not prevent another person from consuming it.7  And because IP is 
non-rival, transactions involving this form of property are 
                                                
6See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL, Chp. 7 (2008) (describing the 
endowment effect as a "peculiarity" of ownership that often affects owners' 
abilities to deal rationally); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal 
Analysis, 97 N.W. L. REV. 1227, 1229 (2003) (providing background on the 
endowment effect and analyzing its impact on legal analysis); Ziv Carmon & Dan 
Ariely, Focusing on the Foregone: How Value Can Appear So Different to Buyers and 
Sellers, 27 J. CON. RES. 360 (2000) (exploring possible explanations of the 
endowment effect); Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and The Endowment Effect, 
20  J. LEG. STUD. 225 (1991) (exploring the impact of the endowment effect in 
various legal contexts); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler, 
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98(6)  J. POL. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 1325 (1990) (finding the existence of an endowment effect 
when subjects were given coffee mugs and offered their cash equivalent); 
Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1  J. ECON. BEHAV. 
& ORG. 39, 43-47 (1980) (labeling the common tendency to refuse to give up 
entitlements even when that entitlement would not have been purchased initially 
as the “endowment effect”). 
7This is a fact that the record companies recently have learned to their cost, as 
consumers duplicated music files and shared them, at virtually zero cost to 
themselves, with friends and strangers alike. 
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fundamentally different from the sorts of transactions studied in the 
existing endowment effects literature.  When parties transact over IP, 
the seller usually does not give up the tangible property itself but only 
the intangible right to earn money through it, and so unlike in cases 
of tangible property, alienation is typically incomplete.8 In light of 
IP’s non-rivalrousness and the incomplete alienation that typically 
characterizes transactions in IP, we thought it possible that the 
valuation anomalies associated with the endowment effect would be 
mitigated, or perhaps even absent, from IP transactions.  Why?  
Because the personal attachment to property or anticipated regret 
following its alienation that leads owners in endowment effect 
experiments to over-value their property may not operate where the 
transaction does not involve the owner’s complete loss of the 
property.   
On the other hand, unlike any experiment in the existing 
literature, the property we planned to study was not simply that with 
which owners had been “endowed” but, instead, property subjects had 
actually created themselves.  We suspected that subjects would feel 
significantly greater personal attachment to property that they had 
created compared to property they had been given. Consequently, we 
arrived at a second hypothesis in direct opposition to our first: i.e., 
that the valuation anomalies associated with the endowment effect 
                                                
8Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 4. Note that in certain types 
of IP transactions, alienation is as “complete” as in transactions involving 
tangible property – for example where the IP transaction involves sale of an 
article like an oil painting or a sculpture that has only been produced in a single 
copy. For most IP transactions, however – such as those involving novels, plays, 
songs, films, poems, photographs, computer software, or prints – the work at 
issue may freely be copied, and therefore alienation is incomplete in that it does 
not entirely deprive the seller of access to the work. 
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would be even more pronounced for owners of the property if they had 
actually created it.  
In a series of experiments involving the creation of poems and 
paintings, we confirmed the second hypothesis and provided 
evidence for the existence of a “creativity effect” – the tendency of 
creators of goods to assign higher value to their works than either 
mere owners of the goods or would-be purchasers of them.9 
 These earlier studies were designed to model the nature of IP 
markets, where the goods sold are not the underlying works 
themselves but simply the opportunity to seek rents through 
ownership of the rights. To do so, we established contests for 
creative works. In one such experiment, we solicited paintings for a 
contest that would be judged by an expert with the winning painting 
receiving a $100 prize.10 The painters (Painters) of the works were 
told that they would be competing with nine other paintings for the 
prize. They were then told that their painting would be shown to 
another subject who had been recruited for the study. That subject 
(the Buyer) would make the Painter a cash offer for the Painter’s 
right to win the prize money if her painting was selected as the 
winner. The Painters were asked to indicate the least amount of 
money that they would be willing to accept (WTA) to sell their 
painting’s chance to win the prize. Each of the Buyers was then 
shown one of the Painters’ paintings and told to indicate the most 
amount of money that they would be willing to pay (WTP) to 
purchase the Painter’s chance to win the prize. Finally, a group of 
                                                
9Id.; Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 38. 
10Id. 
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Owners was recruited for the study. They were told that there would 
be a contest with a $100 prize and that for purposes of the contest 
they owned one of the paintings’ chances to win the prize. They were 
then asked to indicate the least amount of money that they would be 
willing to accept to sell their chance to win the prize. In no case 
would the ownership of the actual painting change hands; the parties 
were only transacting over the chance to win the prize. 
 Our data suggested a large gap between the WTA of the Owners 
of IP-style rights and the WTP of Buyers, consistent with previous 
research on the endowment effect. Furthermore, the data showed a 
large and significant gap between the Painters’ WTA and the Owners’ 
WTA. Thus, Painters’ mean WTA was $74.59, Owners’ mean WTA 
was $40.67, and Buyers’ mean WTP was $17.39. Differences between 
each condition were significant at the p = 0.05 level.11  These results 
suggested the existence of a creativity effect – a pricing anomaly that, 
unlike the endowment effect, related not merely to the ownership of 
property, but to the creation of property.  The creativity effect explains 
why Painters demanded significantly more than Owners to transfer 
the chance of winning the prize.  Authorship, our study suggests, 
produces a tendency to value creativity more highly than does mere 
ownership. 
 These findings are significant for a number of reasons. First, they 
suggest that creators of IP place significantly higher value on their 
works than rational choice theory predicts. Given the zero-sum 
nature of the contest, the mean WTA for the Painters should have 
                                                
11Id. at 40. 
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been around $10 (i.e., a 1 in 10 chance of winning a $100 prize if 
randomly selected). Interestingly, much of the observed over-
valuation appeared to have come from Painters’ substantial over-
optimism in the probability that their work would win the prize. On 
average, they predicted that their paintings would have a 52.8% 
chance of winning.12 Additionally, we found some evidence that 
Painters’ regret aversion (their anticipated anxiety about having sold 
the winning painting) could have led to their higher valuations, but 
that evidence was merely suggestive.13 
 Second, and most importantly, our findings suggested that IP 
markets may be significantly less efficient that law and economics 
accounts have previously supposed. These accounts propose that 
initial distributions of property will have little effect on ultimate 
distributions (at least in a world without transaction costs), because 
property will flow to its highest valued use.14 On the contrary, our 
findings indicate that initial distributions of IP may be incredibly 
sticky. The original owner of IP, very often its creator, will tend to 
systematically overvalue it compared to potential purchasers, resulting 
in a suboptimal number of wealth-maximizing transactions. In many 
instances, we believe, the creators of IP will refuse to sell or license 
their works or inventions when doing so would be mutually 
                                                
12For Owners and Buyers the predicted probabilities are 41.9% and 31.8%, 
respectively. The differences between these probabilities were all statistically 
significant at the p = 0.05 level. 
13Id. at 41. 
14See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 633 (2009); Francesco Parisi, Coase Theorem, in NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 855-61 (Laurence Blume and Steven N. Durlauf 
eds., 2007); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 1 (1960).  
 11 
beneficial. Accordingly, in our previous publications, we offer 
potential remedies to bargaining impasses, including the adoption of 
liability rules and changes to the rules regarding formalities, works-
made-for-hire, and fair use.15 
 
B.  The Value of Attribution and Publication in Law and 
Practice 
 Our previous research focused exclusively on the monetary value 
that the creators of IP assign to their works. As a considerable 
literature suggests, however, creators often seem to care about more 
than just the amount of money that they can earn through their work. 
Wikipedia authors and open source computer programmers write 
without compensation, but they enforce norms about attribution and 
credit.16 Stand-up comics and chefs work in fields without strong IP 
protection, but they often insist upon receiving credit for their 
innovations.17 These and other creators have a host of motivations 
that involve the desire to spread their ideas and the reputational value 
                                                
15Id. at 44-52. 
16See Jon M. Garon, Wiki Authorship, Social Media, and the Curatorial Audience, 
1 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. LAW 95 (2010) (describing the norms governing 
attribution among authors of Wikipedia articles);  Fisk, supra note 1, at 88-92 
(describing the norms governing attribution among programmers of open source 
software). 
17See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The 
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 
94 VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008) (describing the norms governing attribution among 
stand-up comics); Buccafusco, supra note 1 (describing the norms governing 
attribution among chefs); Fauchart & Hippel, supra note 1 (describing norms 
governing attribution among French chefs). See generally Raustiala & 
Sprigman, supra note 1 (describing how chefs, open source software 
programmers, and other creators value attribution). 
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of being thought a successful artist or inventor in addition (or related) 
to monetary compensation. 
 Despite the importance that creators apparently attach to 
attribution, American IP law accords it very little recognition. 
Attribution is nowhere classed among the exclusive rights that U.S. 
copyright law gives to authors – except for a narrow provision, the 
Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), conferring attribution rights on a 
small number of authors of valuable works of fine art.  Passed in 
1990 following America’s accession to the Berne Convention,18 
VARA gives the creators of certain categories of visual art a 
waiveable right of attribution when those works are produced only in 
single works or in limited editions.19 For example, if a movie 
producer licenses a song to be included in the film, copyright law 
creates no formal requirement that the song’s author be credited for 
it. Thus, aside from the narrow protection offered by VARA, if 
authors subject to American copyright law wish to gain attribution 
rights, they must negotiate separately for them.   
 For many years, American authors used trademark law to protect 
their rights to be named as the author of their works. They claimed 
that the failure to include their names on their works amounted to 
illegal “passing off” of the goods as coming from another source.20 
                                                
18H.R. Rep. No. 101-154 at 7-10 (describing relationship of VARA to Berne 
Convention). 
1917 U.S.C. § 106A. 
20See Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 
1171, 1200 (2005) (hereinafter TM Function) (noting the “common belief that 
designations of authorship, like trademarks, could be determined to be true or 
false designations, could mislead consumers as to salient qualities of goods, and 
that protection under trademark law was thus required”).  
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This practice came to an end, however, with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2003 decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., which effectively terminated the use of trademark as a tool for 
obtaining attribution.21 The Court held that trademark law is 
prohibited from extending “passing off” protection to the sorts of 
“communicative goods” that are regulated by copyright law.22 
American copyright law’s scant concern for attribution is 
mirrored, for the most part, in U.S. patent law.  American law has 
long required that the inventor or inventors be named on the patent 
even if the invention was developed and motivated by the inventor’s 
corporate employer. The law has never required, however, that the 
inventor be given any form of credit for the invention as it is actually 
made, marketed, and used.23  
But the situation, at least with respect to copyright, is different 
abroad. Compared with U.S. copyright law, authorial rights to 
attribution figure much more prominently in the copyright law of 
many of our principal trading partners. Most European countries 
extend to creators certain kinds of attribution rights,24 and recently, a 
                                                
21539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
22Id. See generally Christopher Sprigman, Indirect Enforcement of the Intellectual Property 
Clause, 30 Colum. J. L. & Arts 565 (2007) (suggesting that result in Dastar 
represents Supreme Court’s tacit enforcement of limits on Congress’ legislative 
authority under the Patent and Copyright Clause). 
2335 U.S.C. § 111 ("An application for patent shall be made, or authorized to be 
made, by the inventor, except as otherwise provided . . ."). 
24See, e.g., Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, art. L. 121-1, Journal Officiel de la 
Republique Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 3, 1991, p. 8801 
(The French Code provides that "[t]he author shall enjoy the right of respect for 
his name, his authorship, and his work," and that "[t]his right shall be attached 
to his person"); Urheberrechtsgesetz [Copyright Law], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I at 
1273, § 4(1)(13) (F.R.G.) (The German Code provides that the author "shall 
 14 
number of American scholars have called for the U.S. to recognize 
some form of attribution right in its copyright law.25 Although there 
is substantial qualitative evidence that creators value attribution, there 
has, however, been no attempt to measure that value. Our 
experimental framework from the previous studies offered an 
attractive platform for understanding the relationship between 
creators’ interest in reputation and publication and in monetary 
compensation.  
 1.  Attribution in Law and Practice 
 Attribution–the label we use when we assign credit to a person’s 
role in the production of a creative work – can have individual and 
social value for a number of reasons.26 Attribution may be valuable to 
the individual producer of the work, for example, because being 
credited for producing the work may help her obtain further 
employment in the field or sell more works in the future. We can 
                                                                                                                                                       
have the right of recognition of his authorship of the work," may "determine 
whether the work is to bear an author's designation and what designation is to 
be used," and "shall have the right to prohibit any distortion or any other 
mutilation of his work which would prejudice his lawful intellectual or personal 
interest in the work"); Law No. 633 of Apr. 22, 1941, 20-1, Gazzetta Ufficiale 
della Repubblica Italiana, July 16, 1941, No. 166 (The Italian Code provides that 
"the author shall retain the right to claim authorship of his work and to object 
to any distortion, mutilation or any other modification of, and other derogatory 
action in relation to, the work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation").  
25See  Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. 
REV. 41 (2007); Fisk, supra note 1, at 88-92; Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of 
Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1377 (2005); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright 
and Trademark Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263 (2004); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The 
Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and 
Section 43(A), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985 (2002). 
26 For detailed treatments of the values associated with attribution see Fisk, supra 
note 1, at 53-67; Lastowka, TM Function, supra note 20, at 1175-85. 
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think of this as attribution’s extrinsic value. Separately, an individual 
may value attribution, because seeing her name attached to her work 
produces a positive psychic or emotional effect on her well-being.27 
We can call this attribution’s intrinsic value. Finally, attribution may 
have some individual moral or ethical value to the producer of the 
work as a legal and social recognition of her relationship to the 
work.28 We can call this attribution’s moral value.29 
Apart from its individual value, assigning attribution to 
creators may have social value. Connecting a creator with her work 
can aid consumers in making decisions about which products to 
buy,30 and it can assist industries and individuals in assigning credit 
and blame to the successes and failures of products.31 Throughout 
this Article, however, we will be directly concerned with the ways in 
which attribution confers individual value. 
Because of the value that creators seem to attach to 
attribution, European IP regimes grant creators various forms of 
                                                
27See Fisk, supra note 1, at 50 (“Credit is instrumentally beneficial in establishing a 
reputation and intrinsically valuable simply for the pleasure of being 
acknowledged.”); ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR 64 
(1999) (“The ‘utility function’ Linux hackers are maximizing is not classically 
economic, but is the intangible reward of their own ego satisfaction and 
reputation among other hackers.”). 
28See Kwall, supra note 25.  
29We do not intend to suggest that these different values are mutually exclusive. 
They almost certainly are not. 
30See Lastowka, TM Function, supra note 20, at 1179 (“Authorial attribution 
furthers the interests of consumers by reducing the costs of searching for 
creative content.”); Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU 
L. REV. 55, 61-62 (2007). 
31Fisk, supra note 1, at 61 (“…there are circumstances in which people think it 
important to plan for failure and to design attribution regimes whose purpose is 
to allocate blame.”). 
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rights to be named as the authors or inventors of their works. For 
example, the United Kingdom provides authors of certain 
copyrightable works with a waivable right to be named as the author 
of their works in a clear and reasonably prominent manner.32 Other 
countries, however, have established non-waivable attribution rights 
as part of an author’s complement of “moral rights.” The Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne 
Convention”)33 is the primary reference for moral rights in 
international law. Since 1928, the Berne Convention has codified the 
moral rights of attribution and integrity.34 Further, many countries 
have included moral rights of attribution in their IP laws.35 Most 
notably, France and Italy have statutorily granted authors a perpetual, 
                                                
32Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act §§77-78 (1988). See LIONEL BENTLY & 
BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 244-49 (3rd ed. 2009). 
33Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 
1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter "Berne Convention"]. 
34Berne Convention, art. 6bis(1). See Also Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, 
Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. 
LEG. STUD. 195 (1997); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, 
38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 10 (1985). 
35See, e.g., Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, art. L. 121-1, Journal Officiel de la 
Republique Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 3, 1991, p. 8801 
(The French Code provides that "[t]he author shall enjoy the right of respect for 
his name, his authorship, and his work," and that "[t]his right shall be attached to 
his person"); Urheberrechtsgesetz [Copyright Law], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. I at 
1273, § 4(1)(13) (F.R.G.) (The German Code provides that the author "shall have 
the right of recognition of his authorship of the work," may "determine whether 
the work is to bear an author's designation and what designation is to be used," 
and "shall have the right to prohibit any distortion or any other mutilation of his 
work which would prejudice his lawful intellectual or personal interest in the 
work"); Law No. 633 of Apr. 22, 1941, 20, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica 
Italiana, July 16, 1941, No. 166 (The Italian Code provides that "the author shall 
retain the right to claim authorship of his work and to object to any distortion, 
mutilation or any other modification of, and other derogatory action in relation 
to, the work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation"). 
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inalienable right to attribution.36 Some countries (again, most notably, 
France) have granted some artists a “droit de suite” --i.e., a right to 
royalties on the resale of works.37 As should be clear, many other 
countries have placed a much stronger emphasis on protecting artists’ 
moral rights than the United States, and they have sought to enforce 
these rights by international treaty. 
 Despite evidence that creators value attribution as well as pressure 
from international treaty obligations, the U.S. has been reluctant to 
recognize strong forms of attribution rights. The paucity of formal IP 
protection for attribution rights in the U.S. does not, however, mean 
that creators are unable to obtain credit for their efforts; it simply 
means that creators must seek other outlets for protecting their 
interests in attribution. Instead of being a subject of IP law, 
attribution in the U.S. becomes a subject of contract law and the 
operation of social norms.  
 In many creative fields, attribution is a matter of bargaining 
between initial creators and subsequent producers of content.38 As in 
the example used at the beginning of the Article, the photographer 
desiring a published credit with her photograph may insist on the 
                                                
36See Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, art. L. 121-1, § 2, Journal Officiel de la 
Republique Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 3, 1991, p. 8801 
(declaring the right "perpetual, inalienable, and indefeasible"); Law No. 633 of 
Apr. 22, 1941, 22-23, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, July 16, 1941, 
No. 166 (declaring both that the right is inalienable and that it "may be asserted 
without limitation of time" by his descendants and their descendants). 
37See, e.g., Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, art. L. 122-8 (declaring that "[a]uthors 
of graphic and three-dimensional works ... have an inalienable right ... to 
participate in the proceeds of any sale of such work"). 
38See Lastowka, TM Function, supra note 20, at 1174 (“…authors may use 
copyright as a lever to demand attributions of authorship”).  
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inclusion of a contract provision providing for credit as part of the 
bargain she strikes with the newspaper, and it may affect the price she 
gets paid for her work. Relatedly, creators in some fields, especially 
those involving computers and the Internet, often attach licenses to 
the use of their work that require attribution.39 The most common of 
these licenses are established by the Creative Commons organization. 
Approximately 98% of the people who choose Creative Commons 
licenses demand attribution, and so since 2004 Creative Commons 
has not offered a license that does not include an attribution 
requirement.40 
 In many industries, attribution practices are the subject of 
complex bargaining between parties.41 In the movie industry, for 
example, who gets credit and how they receive it (including the order, 
font, and size of their names) are determined by contracts negotiated 
between the movie studios and the guilds representing the various 
members of the industry.42 In other fields, attribution is governed by 
more-or-less formalized norms. Attribution practices for scientific 
research have been proposed by the International Committee of 
Medical Journal Editors. The guidelines dictate who should be named 
as a paper’s author and in what order.43 In other creative fields, 
however, there are few or no norms governing attribution.  In 
                                                
39Lastowka, Digital Attribution, supra note 25, at 59. 
40See Glen Otis Brown, Announcing (and explaining) our new 2.0 licenses, May 
25, 2004, available at http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/4216. 
41See  Fisk, supra note 1, at  76-101. 
42Id. at 76-81. 
43Id. at 83. 
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graphic design and elite cuisine, for example, there appears to be little 
attempt to formalize the norms regarding attribution.44 
 The apparent value that creators attach to attribution has led to 
calls from a variety of scholars for enhanced legal protection for 
attribution and credit in the U.S. Interestingly, as Rebecca Tushnet 
notes, proponents of strengthened attribution laws come from both 
“high protectionist” and “low protectionist” camps.45 Whereas high 
protectionists favor attribution rights as part of enhancing authors’ 
opportunities for complete economic and moral control of their 
works, low protectionists support attribution as a way of protecting 
some degree of authors’ interests in the face of uncompensated and 
uncontrolled uses that they might otherwise not support.46 Although 
the proposals for enhancing attribution rights diverge in many ways, 
support for legal recognition of some sort of right to attribution 
appears to be increasing. Despite this interest, however, there has 
been little previous study of the quantitative value of such a right, or 
whether installing such a right as the default rule in copyright law 
would tend in general to ease or impede bargaining over rights to 
copy, distribute, and use creative works. 
 2.  Modeling the Value of Attribution and Publication 
 If creators value opportunities for attribution and publication, 
then they should be willing to trade off some monetary return on 
their works in favor of those opportunities. It is possible, 
                                                
44Id. at 86-7; Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 1. 
45Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and the Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 
789, 792-93. 
46Id. 
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furthermore, that they value publication and attribution so much that 
the WTA-WTP gap that we have seen in our previous studies 
disappears. Thus, if the composer of a musical work places so much 
value merely on the opportunity to have her song heard or to 
improve her reputation as a composer, she might not insist on very 
much money at all to transfer her IP rights in the song to someone 
who would like to include it in a Hollywood movie. As Greg 
Lastowka has suggested, open source computer coding can be 
thought of in this way.47 Open source coders allow their work to be 
freely distributed to the public on condition that they receive 
attribution for their efforts. Although their coding potentially has 
positive economic value, coders set the price of access at the point 
where it maximizes reputational gains, i.e., at $0.48 The same can be 
said of those who use Creative Commons licenses that require 
attribution or of those who voluntarily write and edit Wikipedia 
entries.49 
 If this kind of attribution-based price discounting occurs often, IP 
markets may in fact be more efficient than we had given them credit 
for in our earlier work. Because creators are typically not given 
attribution rights by U.S. IP law, they will have to bargain for them. 
Presumably, this desire will drive down the price of licensing their 
works relative to licenses that do not provide for attribution. By 
contrast, however, it is possible that some creators will be resistant to 
the idea of having their work published without attribution. They 
                                                
47Lastowka, Digital Attribution, supra note 25, at 59. 
48Id. 
49Garon, supra note 16, at 107. 
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might believe that it is inappropriate or immoral for the work to be 
published without an indication of its creator.50 Accordingly, such 
creators would be less attracted to publication without attribution 
than they would be to monetary compensation standing alone. Both 
of these possibilities receive at least anecdotal support.51 
 The experiments reported below test these propositions. 
Following earlier literature, we assume that creators value 
opportunities for publication and for attribution. Accordingly, when 
given a chance to trade off monetary compensation for those 
opportunities, they will do so, resulting in lower WTA numbers that 
are closer to the prices that prospective buyers might be willing to 
pay for them. 
 It is worth noting one of the assumptions of this model. Earlier 
we explained that creators might value attribution for economic 
and/or moral reasons. They might desire attribution as an 
opportunity to achieve greater financial or artistic success in the 
future, and they might desire attribution because they believe they 
have some ethical right to have their names attached to their works. 
Although one of these preferences is economic and the other moral, 
we assume that whichever reason the creator has for valuing 
                                                
50The attractiveness of attribution requirements in Creative Commons licenses 
suggests as much. 
51See, e.g., Ghostwriting  
FAQs, http://www.dmlowery.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=arti
cle&id=2&Itemid=7 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) ("Q: Does the ghostwriter get a 
credit on the book? As mentioned above, depending on the arrangement, 
attribution or even co-author credit could be negotiated. If so, the fee structure 
usually changes or decreases"); 7 Questions to Ask Before you Hire a 
Ghostwriter, http://www.writeanonfictionbook.com/ARTICLES/7_Question_
Ghostwriter.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) ("Acknowledgement in print is 
often considered part of the fee").. 
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attribution, she will be willing to engage in market exchanges to 
receive it.  
 
II. THE CURRENT STUDIES 
 We performed two separate experiments to test the propositions 
discussed above. The first involved “lay” creative subjects – those 
who indicated an interest in photography. The second involved 
professional and serious amateur creators. 
A. Mechanical Turk Study 
1. MTurk Methods 
For the first experiment, we recruited two hundred 
participants using Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk), a service that 
connects people with online “human intelligence tasks”, or HITs.52  
We listed a HIT on mTurk titled “Aspiring Photographers Wanted 
for a Contest and Study About How People Use Digital Photos.” We 
also provided a short description of the task.53 
 mTurk participants were directed to the Qualtrics survey site,54 
where they consented to participate in the study.  They uploaded a 
digital picture that they had taken themselves, and were instructed 
                                                
52See https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome 
53Subjects were told, “You will upload a digital photo of nature that you've taken 
and answer some questions about it. Your photo will then be entered in a contest 
and judged by photography experts. Prizes may include cash and/or publication 
on a major website.” 
54See http://www.qualtrics.com/ 
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that it was not to include any people.55  The contest rules appeared 
next; participants learned that their photo would be judged against 99 
other photographs by a photography expert and that the winning 
photograph would receive a prize of $1000.  
At this point, the participants were randomly assigned to one 
of three conditions: 
1) Contest Condition: In this condition, participants were told 
that their photo would be viewed by another participant before any 
judging would take place.  The buyer would make a cash offer which, 
if accepted by the photographer, would result in the transfer of the 
opportunity to win the $1000 prize from the photographer to the 
buyer.  The offer was not for the photograph itself, but only for the 
right to be paid the prize if the photograph was judged the winner.  
We’ll refer to this as the photograph’s contest rights.   
Once informed of the rules, the photographer’s willingness to 
accept (WTA) was elicited: that is, she was asked to specify the lowest 
amount she would accept to sell her photograph’s contest rights.  She 
was told that if the buyer’s offer for her photo’s contest rights was 
higher than her WTA, then she would automatically receive that offer 
in cash payable through Mechanical Turk, and she would not receive 
the $1000 should her photo win the contest.  If the offer was lower, 
then she would not receive any cash from the buyer, but still win the 
$1000 if her photo won. This condition replicates those used in our 
previous studies of the creativity effect. 
                                                
55This proviso was included to allay privacy concerns raised by the University of 
Virginia’s Institutional Review Board for Social and Behavioral Sciences, which 
was the human subjects research review body that approved this study. See 
http://www.virginia.edu/vpr/irb/index.html 
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 2) Publication Condition: The price elicitation and offer structure in 
the second condition were identical to the Contest condition.  The 
change from the first condition involved the prize on offer.  In the 
Publication condition, the photographers were offered the 
opportunity to have their photo published, uncredited, “on a major 
website like the Huffington Post.” But the possibility of publication 
would arise only if the photo (a) had been sold to the viewer and (b) 
it won the contest.  That is: 
-- If the photographer’s WTA was lower than the buyer’s 
offer, then the photographer would receive the offer in cash.  If the 
photo then won the contest, the photographer would not receive the 
$1000, but would have the photo published, albeit without the 
photographer’s name.   
-- If the photographer’s WTA was higher than the offer, then 
the photographer would receive no cash from the buyer.  If the 
photo won the contest, the photographer would receive the $1000 
prize, but the photo would not be published. 
 3) Attribution Condition: The condition was identical to the 
Publication condition, but if the conditions specified above were met, 
the photograph would be published along with the photographer’s name.  
Again, if the WTA was lower than the offer, the photographer would 
receive the cash offer.  If the photo won the contest, the 
photographer would not win the $1000 prize, but would have the 
credited photo published.  If the WTA was higher than the offer, 
then the photographer would not receive the cash offer.  If the photo 
won the contest, then the photographer would receive the $1000 
prize, but not have the credited photo published.  
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 We structured the conditions this way in order to determine 
whether our photographer subjects valued publication and 
attribution, and whether their attraction to these prospects would 
reduce their WTA relative to a situation in which publication and 
attribution were not available.  If they attached a significant value to 
the prospect of publication, then we would expect to see subjects in 
the Publication condition report lower WTA than those in the 
Contest condition.  If they attached a significant value to the prospect 
of attribution, we would expect to see subjects in the Attribution 
condition report lower WTA than in both the Publication and 
Contest conditions.   
 After the rules were explained, and comprehension was 
checked, participants entered their WTA.  Participants were asked a 
series of questions about their perceptions of the quality of their 
photographs and their emotional attachment to them.56 We also 
asked several demographic questions.  Participants were then 
thanked, and the experiment ended. Unlike in our previous studies, 
we did not recruit a separate pool of buyers in this experiment since 
our interest was only in the differences between creators’ WTA.57 
                                                
56Subjects were asked: 
-- How good is your photograph? (responses were elicited on a seven point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (Very Bad) to 7 (Very Good)). 
-- What are the chances (the probability) that your photograph is going to 
win the prize? (responses were elicited on a 0-100 slider scale, indicating a 
percentage). 
-- How would you rate your level of personal and emotional investment or 
attachment to your photograph?  (responses were elicited on a seven point Likert 
scale from 1 (Very Low) to 7 (Very High)). 
57We received permission from the IRB to engage in this minor deceit, and 
subjects were told about it at the end of the experiment. 
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 2. MTurk Results 
 Of the 200 participants recruited using mTurk, twenty were 
excluded for answering one or both of the rule comprehension 
questions incorrectly. Based on the scholarly literature reviewed 
above, we hypothesized that creators would find the prospect of 
publication with attribution to be the most valuable, and, thus, that 
the WTA for the Attribution condition would be significantly lower 
than in the Publication or Contest conditions.58 Our hypotheses with 
respect to the Publication condition were less clear. If subjects valued 
the opportunity to get their work “out there” even without their 
names attached, then WTA in the Publication condition should be 
lower than in the Contest condition. But if subjects were indifferent 
to the opportunity for publication without credit or, moreover, if 
they were hostile to the idea, then WTA in the Publication and 
Contest conditions should not diverge. 
 We first compare participants in either the Contest or Publication 
condition, on the one hand, and those in the Attribution condition.  
The subjects in the Attribution condition did, as expected, report a 
significantly lower WTA than “Contest/Publication” subjects – i.e., 
subjects in those two conditions grouped together 
(Contest/Publication M = $202.26, Attribution M = $132.28, t = 
1.98, p = .05).  Thus, when subjects were offered a chance to receive 
credit along with publication of their work, they significantly reduced 
                                                
58Recall that because of the way our study is designed, attaching a higher value to 
attribution should result in a lower WTA in the Attribution condition, because 
creators are willing to sacrifice more monetary compensation in order to receive 
attribution. 
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the amount of money they were willing to accept to part with their 
chance to win the $1000 contest. Furthermore, participants in the 
Attribution condition reported lower WTA than participants in the 
Publication condition standing alone (i.e., not grouped with the 
Contest condition) (Publication M = $226.76, Attribution M = 
$132.28, t = 1.97, p = .052), and this difference was on the edge of 
significance.  
 Interestingly, the other dyadic comparisons were not significant at 
the .05 confidence level. Subjects’ WTA in the Attribution condition 
was lower than in the Contest condition but only at the p = .10 level 
of significance. The difference between Publication and Contest was 
also significant at p = .10, but in the wrong direction. Subjects’ WTA for 
publication without credit was higher than it was merely for the chance 
to win the prize. See Table 1 and Figure 1, below. 
TABLE 1 
Condition N Mean SD 
Contest 60 177.35 260.86 
Publication 61 226.76a 330.58 
Attribution 59 132.28a,b 174.92 
Contest + Publication 121 202.26b 297.85 
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FIGURE 1 
 
a: means differ at a p< .10 level 
b: means differ at a p = .05 level 
There are several things we draw from these results.  First, 
they align with what we have found in previous related experiments59 
involving poems and paintings – i.e., that the creators of works value 
them substantially more than rational choice theory predicts.  Our 
photographers behaved similarly to the poets and painters in our 
previous experiments, and set their WTA significantly higher than 
their expected mean value.  We did not have subjects act as buyers in 
this protocol, but given the enormous spread between the rational 
expected value of the contest chance ($10) and the subjects’ WTA, 
                                                
59Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2; Buccafusco & Sprigman, 
Creativity Effect, supra note 2.   
$177.35  
$226.76  
$132.28  
$202.26  
$0.00  
$50.00  
$100.00  
$150.00  
$200.00  
$250.00  
$300.00  
Contest Publication  Name Contest + 
Publication 
a 
a, b 
b 
 29 
which varied (on average) between $132 (Attribution) and $226 
(Publication), we strongly suspect that there would be a very large 
gap between sellers and buyers were we to modify the protocol to 
include subjects acting as buyers.  Thus, while not direct confirmation 
(because this different protocol does not replicate the earlier 
experiments), our results do align with and support what we have 
found previously. 
Our major finding is that the prospect of publication with 
attribution results in a significantly lower WTA compared to the 
WTA reported by subjects in the Contest and Publication conditions, 
pooled together.  This finding suggests that the prospect of 
publication with attribution has a modest but nonetheless statistically 
significant effect of reducing WTA compared to subjects who are not 
offered the prospect of publication with attribution. 
Interestingly, the Contest and Publication conditions showed 
no significant difference. Recall that we were uncertain whether 
subjects would find uncredited publication attractive enough to 
meaningfully reduce their WTA.  We were surprised, however, that 
the WTA reported by subjects in the Publication condition was, on 
average, higher than mean WTA reported in the Contest condition.  
Why might this be?  Perhaps subjects found unattractive the prospect 
of publication of their photo without attribution. This is consistent 
with the Creative Commons data described above regarding the 
minimal attractiveness of licenses that did not require attribution.60  
Given the strong preference for attribution, publication without 
                                                
60Indeed, since 2004, all CC licenses require attribution as a condition of use – 
there was insufficient demand for licenses that did not. See Brown, supra note 40. 
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attribution may be viewed negatively, which would account for the 
higher average WTA in the Publication condition versus Contest.  
But the difference, it must be remembered, was not significant at the 
.05 confidence level (but it was at the .10 level), so it is also possible 
that the higher WTA in the Publication condition is a matter of 
chance.   
We were also surprised that the Contest/Attribution dyad did 
not manifest a significant difference – although WTA in the 
Attribution condition was lower than in Contest, that difference was 
not significant at the .05 confidence level (although, again, it was 
significant at .10).  Given the weakness of this association, and given 
the borderline significance in the Publication/Attribution dyad, we 
read these results to suggest that the subjects in the mTurk study, 
who were not professional photographers but were selected to be 
representative of the general population, had a modest desire for 
publication with attribution. These results suggest that non-
professional creators place some value on the prospect of credited 
publication, but that attribution is not likely to serve as a complete 
curb on the tendency of non-professional creators to overvalue their 
works.61 
                                                
61Subjects in all conditions reported WTA significantly higher than what a 
rational choice model would predict ($10).  These results align, as we have noted 
earlier, with the findings of our previous experiments.  Nonetheless, we can 
check whether the subjects understood the basic structure of the task by 
comparing what the subjects reported regarding their self-perceived probability 
of winning the contest with reported WTA.  If the subjects understood the task, 
as the former increases, so too should the latter.  And we do see a strong 
association between subjects’ reported percentage chance to win and their WTA 
– the r between the probability of winning and WTA is .38, which is highly 
significant and indeed the reported probability of winning emerges as far the 
most predictive factor of WTA in a regression analysis. 
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B. Professional and Advanced Amateur Photographers 
We turned next to investigate whether professional and 
advanced amateur photographers would behave differently than the 
casual snapshooters in our mTurk subject pool.  We recruited 88 
participants with the aid of two different photography affinity 
groups, the Charlottesville Photography Initiative (CPI), a 
membership group of professional and advanced amateur 
photographers based in Charlottesville, Virginia, and Photo District 
News (PDN), the largest U.S. monthly magazine for professional 
photographers. In contrast to subjects in the mTurk sample, who 
reported spending an average of 5.56 hours a week on photography, 
the participants in the CPI/PDN sample reported spending an 
                                                                                                                                                       
 We should note that although the strong correlation between the subjects’ 
perceived probability of winning the contest and their WTA suggests that the 
participants understood the task and behaved rationally given their perceptions 
of their chances, the subjects’ subjective perception of the likelihood that they 
would prevail are, on average, significantly overoptimistic.Only 5.6% of the 
sample reported that they believed their probability of winning was 1% or lower, 
the probability if the judges picked the winner of the contest at random.  Fully 
47.2% of the sample responded that their chances of winning were better than 
50%.  As an illustration, a well-calibrated, rational sample could have at most, 
two participants reporting their chances were 50%, and the rest reporting 0.  A 
well-calibrated, rational sample will have a sum of probabilities of winning (for 
180 subjects, each of whom was led by the experimenters to believe that he had a 
1% average chance of winning) of 180%.  Compare that to the sum of 
probabilities observed – which amount to 7862.4% (!) – and you begin to 
understand the extent to which over-optimism shapes our results. 
 Additionally, and importantly, none of the other measures differed as a 
function of condition.  If the subjects understand the task correctly, their 
predicted probability of winning should not change between conditions, as the 
assumptions about the likelihood of winning (e.g. how many other participants 
there are, the estimated quality of the other participant’s photos) do not vary.  
The fact that perceived probability of winning stays roughly constant across 
conditions suggests that differences in WTA are being driven by the individual’s 
valuation of the publication and attribution. 
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average 21.24 hours per week on photography.  Fully 72.4% of 
subjects in the CPI/PDN sample reported spending at least 10 hours 
a week on photography, compared to the 81.7% of subjects in the 
mTurk sample who spent fewer than 10 hours per week on 
photography. 
The study design was identical to that used for the mTurk 
participants, with subjects randomly assigned to the Contest, 
Publication, or Attribution conditions. Eleven participants were 
excluded from analysis due to failure to understand the rules of the 
contest.  The remaining 77 participants showed a pattern somewhat 
different from the mTurk sample.  As in mTurk, participants in the 
Attribution condition reported a WTA lower than that reported by 
the pooled Contest and Publication subjects, and the difference was 
on the edge of significance at the .05 level (Contest/Publication M = 
380.44, Attribution M = 234.79, t = 1.97, p = .052).  Unlike in the 
mTurk study, however, the dyadic comparisons revealed that 
participants in the Attribution condition reported significantly lower 
WTA than those in the Contest condition (Contest M = 440.25, 
Attribution M = 234.79, t = 2.098, p = .044).  Compared to the 
condition in which creators were merely offered a chance to win the 
$1000 prize, subjects who were offered a chance to have their 
photographs appear in a major media outlet with their names 
attached reduced their WTA by over 50%.  
Interestingly, in this sample of professional and serious 
amateur photographers, the pattern of the WTA responses was 
consistent with the hypothesis that creators attach some positive 
value to publication even in the absence of attribution, although the 
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data, given our smaller sample size, do not reach statistical 
significance (Contest M = $440.25, Publication + Attribution M = 
$287.90, t = 1.66, p = .10). It is possible that a larger sample would 
reduce the variability of our data resulting in significant differences 
between Contest and Publication and between Publication and 
Attribution.62  See Table 2 and Figure 2, below. 
TABLE 2 
Condition N Mean SD 
Contest 20 440.25a 384.20 
Publication 29 339.19 409.04 
Attribution 28 234.79a,b 248.90 
Contest + Publication 49 380.44b 398.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
62Once again, differences in the other dependent variables failed to emerge 
between conditions.  Most importantly, participants were not more likely to 
believe in their probability of winning the contest as a function of condition, nor 
did their valuation of the nonmonetary benefits of winning the contest vary. 
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FIGURE 2 
 
a: means differ at a p< .10 level 
b: means differ at a p< .05 level 
 Again, we can draw a number of conclusions from these findings.  
First, as in the mTurk study, the CPI/PDN study broadly aligns with 
our previous studies involving poems and paintings – in all these 
studies, creators reported WTAs that were, on average, far above 
what the rational choice model would predict.  And in the CPI/PDN 
study, professional and advanced amateur photographers reported 
average WTAs that were even higher than the significantly inflated 
WTAs reported by casual snapshooters in the mTurk study.  One 
might hypothesize that the subjects in our CPI/PDN study would 
have reported lower WTAs than those in the mTurk study because 
they had, on average, far more experience as photographers and 
would therefore have a more realistic appraisal of their photograph’s 
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chance of winning the contest.  But if anything, the opposite proved 
to be the case – the CPI/PDN subjects reported an even higher 
perceived likelihood of winning the contest (though not significantly 
so, mTurk M = 43.68 (27.58), CPI/PDN M = 48.42 (32.80), t = 1.11, 
n.s.), and this even more intense over-optimism translated into higher 
WTA (again, we found a powerful correlation between perceived 
chance of winning and WTA: mTurkr = .239, CPI/PDN r = .383, 
both rs significant at the .001 level). 
 Second, and most importantly, the data from the CPI/PDN 
subjects suggest that professional and advanced amateur 
photographers place a somewhat greater value on the prospect of 
publication with attribution compared with their mTurk counterparts.  
Subjects’ WTA in the Attribution condition was lower by a 
significant amount compared the Contest subjects.  This is fairly 
strong evidence that creators attach some substantial value to 
credited publication of their work.  
 Using the subjects’ responses, we can roughly calculate the value 
that they attach to the prospect of publication with attribution. The 
differences between mean WTA for those in the Attribution 
condition from those in the Contest condition is $205.46. But the 
photographers only would have received publication and attribution 
if their photograph won the prize. Thus, the average value they 
assigned to attribution can be thought of as the difference between 
the conditions’ means divided by subjects’ perceived chance of 
winning the prize. Across conditions, subjects’ mean expected 
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probability of winning the prize was 49.5%. Accordingly, the 
creators’ behavior indicates that they valued attribution at $415.07.63  
 We should emphasize, however, that although the prospect of 
publication with attribution does meaningfully reduce WTA, the 
subjects in the Attribution condition still reported mean WTA 
enormously in excess of what the rational choice model would 
predict ($234.79 compared to an expected value of $10). Thus, at 
least based on this study, we do not believe that the prospect of 
attribution is sufficient to eliminate the creativity effect shown in 
previous experiments.  
 A third, related observation arises from a comparison of subjects’ 
WTA in the mTurk and CPI/PDN studies with those reported in the 
earlier poetry and painting studies.  Mean WTA in every condition in 
both the mTurk and CPI/PDN studies exceeded the average rational 
choice expected value of the prize by a multiple far greater than mean 
WTA reported in either the poetry or painting studies. One 
difference between those studies was the size of the prize for winning 
the contest.  In the poetry and painting studies, these were $50 and 
$100, respectively.  Both prior studies involved contests with 10 
participants, so the average rational choice expected value of the 
prize in those studies was therefore $5 and $10, respectively.  In the 
mTurk and CDI/PDN studies, in contrast, a $1000 prize was offered 
for winning the contest, which included 100 participants, with a 
resulting average rational choice expected value of $10.  In each 
                                                
63We observe a similar pattern, though to a lesser degree in the mTurk sample.  
The difference in WTA between the Contest and Attribution conditions was 
$45.07, and the estimated probability of winning across conditions was 42.38%, 
indicating a valuation of attribution of $106.35. 
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study, creators’ WTA was a multiple of the rational expected value, 
but the multiples grew along with the size of the prize on offer. This 
suggests that subjects are focusing substantially more on the 
magnitude of the prize than on the probability of winning it.64 
 One might have hypothesized that a larger prize would focus 
subjects’ attention on the value of their chance, and therefore, would 
move subjects WTA closer to the rational choice value.  Alternatively, 
one might have hypothesized that a larger prize would be so 
attractive to subjects, and the prospect of winning so alluring, that 
the subjects’ average WTA would grow along with the prize.  This 
second hypothesis obviously fits better with our data, and, although 
we have not tested this proposition directly, the larger average 
valuation in this study relative to our earlier work suggests to us that 
in IP markets where the “winner” can expect to reap large rewards, 
creators will be especially prone to overvalue their chances of 
prevailing, and consequently the value of their work.  We can readily 
imagine a protocol designed to test this directly and may do so in 
future. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND POLICY 
Our previous poetry and painting studies demonstrated 
significant valuation gaps between creators and potential buyers in IP 
transactions.  These valuation gaps do not mean that IP transactions 
                                                
64For similar findings see Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, 
Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185 
(2001) (finding that the typical subject was willing to pay $10 to avoid a 99% 
chance of a painful electric shock, and $7 to avoid a 1% chance of the same 
shock). 
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never occur – obviously, we see IP bought, sold, and licensed in the 
real world every day.  Our initial experiments do suggest, however, 
that because the parties to such transactions might start further apart 
than the rational choice model would predict, they will be obliged to 
spend more on negotiation to get to a deal.  These higher transaction 
costs mean fewer transactions,65 and our results therefore raised the 
possibility that IP markets might be less efficient than previously 
believed. These markets may be clearing at a lower level of output – 
i.e., with fewer valuable deals being made – than they would be in the 
absence of endowment and creativity effects.  
One limitation of our earlier experiments was that the 
expected payoff was purely monetary.  This differs from the real 
world in which the parties – and especially the creators – may 
contemplate a number of possible monetary and non-monetary 
benefits of transacting.  As noted above, there is considerable 
evidence in the academic literature suggesting that creators value 
opportunities for attribution and publication in addition to direct 
monetary compensation.66 Thus, it seemed that the gap between 
creator and buyer valuation of IP might be substantially reduced or 
even eliminated were the prospect of publication – and especially 
publication with attribution – offered to the seller/creators. Thus, 
                                                
65See Russell Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1107-1110 
(2000). 
66Buccafusco, supra note 1, at 1152-53. 
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these new experiments are, in part, an attempt to improve the 
ecological validity67 of our previous research. 
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, our new 
experiments provide the first quantitative measure of the monetary 
value that creators attach to attribution and publication opportunities. 
Although a considerable body of research has documented creators’ 
desires for attribution, none of this work has attempted to measure 
attribution’s economic value. Our experiments provide new data that 
can help shape the debate about the desirability of attribution rights 
in the U.S. and abroad. 
A.  Improving the Previous Studies 
The new data we have obtained from the mTurk and 
CPI/PDN studies suggest that attribution opportunities may drive 
down creators’ selling prices, thereby dampening some of the 
magnitude of the creativity effect. Our new results suggest that 
creators do attach some value to the prospect of publication with 
attribution, and they reduce their WTA when presented with that 
prospect.  But our data also suggest that the prospect of publication 
with credit is no panacea – while we saw statistically significant 
reductions in both our studies, subjects in the Attribution condition 
in both studies persisted in reporting WTA significantly above what 
the rational choice model would predict. Note that although WTA 
dropped substantially in the Attribution condition, the mean WTA 
                                                
67Marilynn Brewer, Research Design and Issues of Validity, in HANDBOOK OF 
RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY (HARRY T. 
Reis & Charles Judd eds. 2000). 
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numbers were still $234 and $132 in the CPI/PDN and mTurk 
studies, respectively. Given our findings from the previous 
experiments, it is unlikely that there would have been many buyers 
willing to pay this much to obtain the creators’ chances of winning 
the prize. In those studies, buyers’ WTP amounts are usually fairly 
close to the rational expected value of the prize, which in this case 
was $10.68 
Interestingly, our data also suggest that the prospect of 
publication without attribution has no effect in reducing creators’ 
WTA, and may even, in some instances, increase it.  Scholars who 
commented on our previous papers had suggested that creators may 
value having their work “out there.” Perhaps they merely want to 
improve the world irrespective of financial or reputational gain. They 
may feel a “warm glow” of pleasure knowing that they have made a 
contribution to knowledge or the arts.69 Some Wikipedia editors may 
feel this way.70 Our study, however, did not detect any evidence of 
such an effect on creators’ WTA. 
Of course, we cannot say that our study proves that creators 
do not value publication absent attribution. There is good reason to 
                                                
68Buccafusco & Sprigman, Valuing IP, supra note 2, at 20-21; Buccafusco & 
Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 40-44 
69James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-
Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464 (1990). 
70See Garon, supra note 16, at 99-100; see also YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF 
NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 
72-74 (2006) (contending that Wikipedia authors derive pleasure from writing, 
and agree to abide by particular writing norms to participate in a common 
publishing endeavor). 
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think that they do.71 Our failure to detect any effect on WTA by the 
prospect of publication may be due to the group of subjects we used. 
Mere publication may have less value in the field of photography 
than it does in the more networked and collective environment of 
Wikipedia. It is possible, however, that publication without 
attribution may be viewed negatively by creators – and perhaps more 
negatively than no publication at all. To the extent that creators 
believe they have a right to be credited for their work, they may 
dislike the idea of having their work published without attribution.  
Thus, at least in the markets for photographs that we have 
created, attribution and publication do not play so strong a role in 
creators’ utility functions that creators are willing to entirely part with 
their works’ economic value to obtain them. While attribution seems 
to affect the amount of money that creators are willing to accept to 
sell their IP rights, the diminution is marginal when compared to the 
overall magnitude of the creativity effect. Accordingly, while 
bargaining over attribution might make markets for creative or 
innovative goods less inefficient than we previously suggested, it does 
not appear to produce a Coasean world of freely flowing goods. 
Initial distributions of IP rights will still likely be highly sticky, and 
otherwise efficient bargains will not be made due to creators’ 
overvaluations. 
B.  Valuing a Right of Attribution 
Beyond the supplement they provide to our previous research, 
our new experiments are also valuable, and perhaps more so, for the 
                                                
71See Garon, supra note 16, at 100-102. 
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light they shed on the emerging question of whether and how to 
provide creators a right of attribution. U.S. copyright, which provides 
creators of a wide variety of artistic and literary works with broad 
rights to control reproduction, distribution, modification, and the 
public performance and display of their works, does not provide 
most creators with any specific right to attribution.72  This is in 
contrast with copyright laws in most European nations, which 
provide authors with rights to attribution as part of a broader 
complement of “moral rights” that also include provisions allowing 
authors to prevent the alteration or destruction of an their work,73 
and also, in some jurisdictions, to claim a share of proceeds from 
resale of the work.74 
Our research provides quantitative empirical evidence for the 
notion that creators significantly value attribution. The normative 
implications of this finding, however, are not entirely clear.  We 
suspect that different readers will take divergent messages from our 
findings, and that follow-up experimental work will be required to 
better understand the specific policy implications of our present 
findings. 
 1.  Implications for Moral Rights Theories of IP 
                                                
72With the exception of the narrow rights granted under VARA.  See note 19, 
supra. 
73Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, 
July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221; see also Cyrill P. Rigamonti, 
Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 357-59 (noting that French 
and German concepts of moral rights grant authors the right to object to 
modification of their works). 
74See CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE art. L111 (Fr.) 
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On one hand, scholars who contend that a right of attribution 
should be protected by U.S. copyright law may find support for their 
position in the value that creators attach to it in our studies. Creators 
were potentially willing to sacrifice a significant amount of cash in 
order to have their names attached to their photographs if they won. 
As noted above, the estimated value that the professional 
photographers attached to publication with attribution was $415.37. 
From this perspective, creators’ statements about the desire for 
attribution do not merely appear to be post hoc rationalizations of 
prior behaviors or of community norms but rather explicit ex ante 
trade offs when they have skin in the game.  
Yet even here, the implications are not entirely clear. Some 
moral rights theorists support an attribution right on the grounds that 
it is ethically required as a matter of the creator’s relationship with her 
work. This is the moral value we discussed earlier.75 Many creators, 
however, may value attribution not due to a moral or spiritual 
connection with their work but simply because attribution is a 
valuable economic tool for improving their reputations and obtaining 
additional work – the extrinsic value of attribution discussed above.76 
Unfortunately, our data were unable to distinguish between the 
different kinds of value that creators could have been attaching to 
attribution.  
 2.  Implications for Utilitarian Theories of IP 
                                                
75See Kwall, supra note 25. 
76See Fisk, supra note 1. 
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Some proponents of attribution right protection see its 
justification not as a matter of moral principle but as a contribution 
to the utilitarian system of incentives and access that U.S. IP law 
implements. From this perspective, attribution, just like any other 
aspect of IP rights, should be assigned in such a way that it likely to 
reduce transaction costs and generate efficient bargains.77 Contrary to 
its implications for moral rights theorists, our research seems to 
undermine the arguments for creating a waivable attribution right.  
Our previous studies suggested that large bargaining gaps are 
likely to exist between creators and licensors of IP due to the 
formers’ overvaluation of their work.78 These bargaining gaps create 
substantial transaction costs that likely lead to inefficient markets and 
a suboptimal number of transactions.79 Under the current copyright 
regime in the U.S., creators who desire attribution must bargain for it. 
The findings reported in this Article imply that creators are willing to 
significantly decrease the amount of money they are willing to accept 
to license their work in exchange for attribution. Accordingly, 
compared to a regime with a default attribution right, the current U.S. 
copyright system probably results in more efficient (albeit likely still 
far from perfectly efficient) bargaining. 
To see how, recall the examples at the beginning of the Article. The 
party desiring to license a work has a budget determined by its 
estimate of the likely value of the work. It may also assign some cost 
to providing attribution to the creator. In cases like the magazine 
                                                
77See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 5. 
78Buccafusco & Sprigman, Creativity Effect, supra note 2, at 38. 
79Id. 
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publisher, providing attribution may have very low cost to the 
publisher, while in cases like the politician’s memoir, it may have high 
cost to the publisher. The creator will also have an estimate of the 
value of her work and of the benefit of receiving attribution. As can 
be seen in the figures below, if creators value attribution and are 
willing to forego direct monetary compensation to receive it, the gap 
between the valuations of the two parties would shrink. This is true 
whether or not the licensor itself assigns any cost to providing 
attribution to the creator. As the valuations between the parties 
shrinks, we can expect more transactions to take place.80  See Figure 
3, below.  
FIGURE 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
80See Russell B. Korobkin, Who Wins in Settlement Negotiations, 11 AM. L. & 
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offers is inversely correlated with the likelihood of successful bargaining). 
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Now contrast this scenario with one in which the creator 
receives a default attribution right that is waivable. In negotiations 
with the magazine, for whom provision of attribution has a negligible 
cost, bargaining will look like it does in our previous studies, i.e., 
negotiations will only involve the economic value of the license. This 
creates the large bargaining zone that we have shown previously. The 
situation is even worse when the licensee assigns a significant cost to 
providing attribution, as with the memoirist. Here, we can expect to 
see not only the bargaining gap caused by the creativity effect but 
also an additional endowment effect attached to attribution. Once the 
creator has been given an attribution right as part of her default 
endowment, there is every reason to believe that she will overvalue it 
with respect to the amount of money she would have paid to receive 
it in the absence of an endowment. Thus, the licensor who assigns 
cost to providing attribution will have to negotiate over both the 
creative work and attribution. This will likely lead to even greater 
transaction costs and fewer bargains.  See Figure 4, below. 
FIGURE 4 
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Some creative industries – motion picture and software in 
particular – have objected to an attribution requirement, arguing that 
providing attribution to the large number of people who provide 
creative input to a movie or a software product would be impractical 
and would interfere with private arrangements within the industry 
that determine who is credited for creative work.81 Creating a default 
rule favoring attribution, given the modest benefits we observe, 
might make bargaining in these industries even more costly.  
These arguments apply to the prospect of adopting a waivable 
attribution right as in VARA. Recall, however, that some European 
countries have established non-waivable attribution rights. 82 From 
this perspective, the economic case against such a right is even 
stronger. In such a situation, the parties cannot transact at all over 
whether attribution is provided. Thus, in instances where it costs 
something to the licensee to provide attribution, and where 
transacting to waive it would leave both parties better off (i.e., where 
the cost to publisher outweighs benefit to rightsholder), having a 
non-waivable right introduces an intractable inefficiency into the 
licensing market.  In such cases, we would expect deal prices to fall, 
although it is difficult to say by how much. This situation would be 
difficult to model experimentally, at least with a protocol like ours, 
because transacting over attribution is not possible by definition.   
We wish to emphasize that our research does not definitively 
answer questions about the value of providing attribution rights. 
                                                
81See Fisk, supra note 1, at 77. 
82See sources cited at note 24, supra. 
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Whether copyright should incorporate an attribution right is a 
complicated question, to which our data provide nothing close to a 
full answer.  They do, however, provide new insight into both the 
moral and economic value of attribution. From an economic 
perspective, the law’s decisions about such matters should be the 
result of carefully weighing the costs and benefits of the right. While 
our data cannot fully describe these, they do point to some previously 
overlooked costs of creating a default waivable attribution right.  
One possibility for overcoming the potential inefficiencies 
associated with creating a waivable attribution right would be to 
condition the right on the author complying with certain conditions 
upon publication of the work. The U.S. copyright system traditionally 
made the grant and maintenance of copyright subject to a set of 
mandatory requirements that together became known as copyright’s 
“formalities”.83  At copyright’s inception in 1790 and for almost 200 
years thereafter, the initial grant of copyright was made subject either 
to a requirement that the author enter the work on the official 
copyright registry, or that he mark all published copies with notice of 
copyright (or both).  In addition, traditionally the copyright system 
required authors to renew (effectively, to re-register) their works after 
a relatively short initial term.  Failure to comply with registration 
and/or notice formalities meant that the work entered the public 
domain without a copyright ever arising.  Failure to comply with the 
renewal requirement meant that the work moved into the public 
                                                
83For a summary of the details and effect of the traditional system of copyright 
formalities, see generally Christopher Jon Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004). 
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domain after the expiration of the initial term of copyright. There 
were, in addition, fees associated with the registration and renewal 
formalities, and these fees served as a filter – similar to those 
operating today in the patent system – that tended to restrict 
copyright to works with some substantial commercial value.84 
Given the substantial gaps between creators’ WTA and buyers’ 
WTP that we see in our experiments, some mechanism to limit 
aspects of copyright to works of substantial commercial value would 
be helpful, because it is only for these works that parties will be 
willing to invest in the negotiation necessary to overcome substantial 
valuation gaps.  Thus, formalities served an important and previously 
unappreciated function in limiting copyright to those works for 
which a relatively expensive property regime could be expected to 
work efficiently.  Following the Copyright Act of 1976, however, 
mandatory formalities have been removed from the law.  Copyright 
now arises automatically and indiscriminately whenever a creative 
work is fixed in any tangible medium of expression.85  There is now 
no screen that limits the application of copyright’s strong property 
rights to works with some substantial commercial value.  As a 
consequence, many – indeed, the vast majority – of works that are 
subject to copyright’s property rule have no substantial commercial 
value.  Until recently, that hardly would have mattered – the 
economics of distribution meant that few uses could effectively be 
made of works with low commercial value.  But as the Google Book 
Search project – and other efforts involving mass digitization, such as 
                                                
84See id. at 502. 
85See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (defining copyrightable subject matter). 
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the Internet Archive’s Million Books Project – show, in the current 
environment of very low-cost digital distribution of works, a wide 
range of uses of works of otherwise low commercial value become 
possible.  These contemplated uses, which may produce social value, 
may, however, often be insufficiently valuable (at least with respect to 
individual works) to bear the significant negotiation costs required to 
overcome the valuation anomalies arising from endowment effects, 
in addition to other negotiation costs and the risk of strategic 
behavior.  And again, because these transactions will tend to involve 
parties who have less market experience, they are likely to involve the 
kinds of sellers most subject to valuation biases.   
We have elsewhere described how the U.S. might change its 
copyright law to enjoy the benefits of formalities without offending 
the Berne Convention, the leading international agreement governing 
copyright law, which forbids the U.S. from implementing formalities 
(at least as they apply to the works of non-U.S. nationals) that affect 
the “exercise and enjoyment” of copyright.86 The results of our 
current experiments, which suggest that attribution will play a modest 
role in abating pricing anomalies in IP transactions, counsel that 
adoption of Berne-compliant formalities would be a better strategy 
for addressing the inefficiencies in IP licensing created by 
endowment and creativity effects relative to the adoption of a 
copyright rule favoring or mandating attribution.  
 
 
                                                
86See Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing, supra note 83, at 547. 
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CONCLUSION 
Scholars have often addressed the value that creators attach to 
publication and attribution, yet little research has attempted to 
empirically test the existence or magnitude of that value. These 
experiments have done so with interesting and suggestive results. Our 
research indicates that creators do assign significant value to 
attribution but limited if any value to publication on its own. The 
amount that they value attribution, however, does not completely 
eradicate the valuation gaps and market inefficiencies that we have 
found previously. Moreover, our research suggests that from a 
utilitarian perspective, providing a default waivable attribution right 
may make matters worse. 
Future research is needed, however, to test the robustness of 
our findings. Moreover, our experiments all focused on a single 
medium – photography – that typically has low expectations of 
attribution. It is possible that in other media where attribution is 
standard – painting, literature, and music – the value that creators 
attach to it will be greater. It would also be worth comparing our 
findings to situations, such as open source computer coding, in which 
the value that creators attach to attribution results in free access to 
content. 
 
